Letter From:   Marine Major in Iraq
 

Subject: (U) A new "Thought"

Camp Victory, Iraq
Friday 06 Aug 04
 
A thought from Iraq - "The Defense of LZ Goose"
 
In the Fall of 1997, as a Marine Captain at Camp Lejeune, NC, I took about 35 Marines from my engineer company to the field to act as the Opposition Forces (OPFOR - "notional bad guys") for an infantry battalion's readiness exercise.  At one point the scenario called for the OPFOR to guard a mock supply dump located at the northern edge of a helicopter landing zone (LZ) known as "Goose."  LZ Goose is a large grassy rectangle cut out of the North Carolina pine, with the long axis of the rectangle roughly running north-south.  The northeastern edge is bordered by tidal swamp that is all but impenetrable except by boat.  The eastern edge is dense forest that would be very difficult for any large number of troops to get through without making a lot of noise.  The southern and western sides of the LZ are more accessible, with forest that is less dense and more trafficable.
 
We arrived in the late-morning or early afternoon to establish our defensive position, as the scenario said that the unit being evaluated would not be in position to attack until later that night.  As soon as we arrived we moved into the woods on the northwestern edge of the LZ and began to emplace.  I set up a large radio antenna and put a Marine on the radio.  At least, that's what it looked like from the point of view of the Marines from the "other side" who we knew were watching us. Here's what really happened.  After my Marines moved into the woodline, two-thirds of them moved through the woods to the northeastern side of the LZ (the area bordered by the swamp and impenetrable woods) and started digging the real defensive positions there, behind a small bluff (very small - there are no hills in eastern North Carolina).  The other third of the Marines worked real hard at scraping the ground and making a lot of digging noises, and the Marine by the antenna with the radio wasn't talking to anyone, but sure looked like he was.  
 
After dark, we took down the antenna and occupied the real positions on the northeast side of the LZ.  Then we waited.  We had the swamp to our northeast & the thick woods to the east.  The LZ to our west was wide open and anyone trying to cross it would attract huge amounts of attention.  The only real way to get to us was through a narrow strip of woods to the northwest, bordered by the LZ on one side & the swamp on the other.  It was through this wooded strip that we established our defense in depth - multiple fighting holes arrayed so that the attackers would have to get through all of them to defeat us.  
 
At about midnight the reinforced company made its way through the woods to the west and attacked our positions - the dummy positions we had abandoned at dark.  We remained silent our fighting holes while the infantry company fired up the area where we weren't (with blanks - this wasn't live fire). We had our radios on their tactical net (for safety purposes only) and heard them say, "We've taken the position and the enemy has fled." The regimental commander (who knew our tactical scheme and was watching from his vehicle parked just off the LZ) came on the radio and said, "The enemy is still in the area.  You haven't found them yet.  It took them another 45 minutes to an hour of probing until they ran into our forward positions.  By the time they began their attack, many of them were out of ammunition and the regimental commander came back on the radio and said, "I think we've learned enough for tonight's exercise.  Let's ENDEX (End of Exercise) now."  There were enough of them and so few of us that we would have lost had it been real, but it would have been very costly for the attackers.  
 
I share this not to boast about any tactical acumen, but to illustrate how easy it is to employ tactical deception.  Here's an example from WWII.  In the early days of Operation BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the USSR, the Soviets were reeling from the Wehrmacht's onslaught through the Ukraine, and withdrew from Kiev, leaving the city in German hands.  The largest, most beautiful mansion in Kiev was left fully in tact by the Soviets, and the German high command eyed it longingly for their headquarters. Knowing that it might be booby trapped, they sent in their explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists to ensure that the building was safe.  The German experts found a large explosive charge buried under the cellar and removed it safely.  Having found that charge, they stopped looking. About 30 days later, after the German command was firmly ensconced in the building, a much larger explosive charge, buried below the "decoy" charge found by EOD, detonated, literally blowing the mansion sky-high and killing everyone in and around it.  The crater was over 200 feet across and 50 feet deep.  The explosion was heard and felt by the Soviet commanders over 60 miles away.  
 
Why do I bring up tactical deception now?  In recent days we have been inundated by news of a "treasure trove" of intelligence about Al Qaeda's plans, reconnaissance and activities.  A recently captured Al Qaeda suspect has supposedly provided critical information that gives us a better window on Al Qaeda's network and operations.  What I want to suggest is that perhaps we are seeing exactly what the bad guys want us to see, just like the exercise force reconnaissance Marines did at LZ Goose, and like the German EOD did in Kiev, and that biting on their deceptive bait may just make us more vulnerable.  Maybe the capture of that suspect and his computer in Pakistan was, in fact,  a huge coup and as a result we have set Al Qaeda's clock back another few months yet again.  And perhaps we have some really smart people in the HAS and FBI who understand tactical deception and are quietly working behind the scenes while outwardly making it look like we are only focused on the new information we have acquired, thereby turning the tactical deception on the deceivers.  I hope so.  
 
When we come upon seemingly important enemy activities or intelligence, we must always ask ourselves, "Are we seeing what the enemy intends for us to see, or what he intends to hide from us?" and then decide where we should focus our efforts - and where we are willing accept some risk, because it is impossible to anticipate every possible enemy action.  This is the reality we are in - this is war.  
 
If you've made it this far, I thank you for bearing with me through the long narrative.  Hopefully it has given you something to chew on. Have a great day - W. J. Truax Jr.

© copyright 2004 WJ Truax

The views are my own and do not necessarily represent the position of the US military or the US Marine Corps. or this website.
 
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